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Market Liquidity and Exposure of Hedge Funds
Abstract
We examine whether the drastic improvement in liquidity in the US stock
market after 2003 has impacted the systematic exposures of hedge funds to the
US-stock market. The relation between market exposure and Amihud's illiq-
uidity measure reverses signicantly around a breakpoint situated somewhere
around 2003. The results are robust to dierent fund selection criteria, volatil-
ity timing, the presence of illiquid holdings and the exact position of the break
point. Using the returns to a pairs trading strategy as a sorting criterion for
creating portfolios, we nd that the eect is strongest for funds that have a sig-
nicantly positive loading on the pairs trading return. The results suggest that
before 2003, time-varying illiquidity led to a time-varying long bias in US-stock
market exposure. The reversal of the relationship points towards liquidity timing
by hedge funds in the most recent period, after the introduction of automated
trading on the New York stock exchange in March 2003.
Keywords: hedge funds, market liquidity, limits to arbitrage, liquidity timing,
pairs trading
JEL-Classication: G12, G23.
1 Introduction
In 2003, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) nalized a change in market structure
with the introduction of Autoquote, an automated trading system. The ndings of
Hendershott et al. (2011) show that this change had a large impact on the cost of
trading. Not only did the transition to Autoquote lower spreads, but it also facilitated
algorithmic trading in a major way. The bid-ask spreads and other measures of the
market impact of trading decreased markedly in 2003. The nding of Hendershott
et al. is illustrated in Figure 1, where we show the evolution over time of Amihud's
(2002) illiquidity measure, a proxy for the price impact of trading and used throughout
this paper. We can clearly see that the costs of trading and associated liquidity of the
stock market improved drastically after 2003. One likely group of market participants
that is expected to be inuenced by this general and widespread improvement in stock
trading, are hedge funds. Equity-oriented hedge funds are known for their dynamic
trading strategies and the advent of electronic trading has seen a surge of interest in
algorithmic trading, much of which is performed by hedge funds. In this paper we
study the relationship between the stock market exposure of hedge funds and market
liquidity and test whether it changed over time, specically before and after 2003.
Hedge funds assets have grown tremendously the last decade, but their short average
lifespan and lavish compensation of managers begs the question of the real benets to
the nancial system. The disappointing performance over the credit crisis, their role
in bidding up CDO prices, as well as the alleged short selling of bank's shares during
the crisis, makes the question of the sources of performance and systematic risk all the
more relevant.
The systematic risk of hedge funds is not straightforward to measure. Hedge funds can
change exposures quickly or use derivatives so that the relationships with traditional
asset classes is highly nonlinear, see example Fung and Hsieh (1997), Agarwal and
Naik (2004), Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), Fung and Hsieh (2001), Bollen and Whaley
(2009). Also, there are issues in reported returns, such as survivor and backll-bias
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Figure 1: Market liquidity
The graph shows the monthly median of Amihud's ILLIQ measure for all the stocks in the
S&P 500, S&P 400 (Midcap) and S&P 600 (Smallcap), respectively.
(Posthuma and Sluis (2003),Liang (2000)), serial correlation due to valuation models
for illiquid assets, return smoothing or outright misreporting (Getmansky et al. (2004),
Asness et al. (2001), Bollen and Pool (2009)). In addition, the relatively short lifespan
of hedge funds prohibits modeling the time-variation in exposure to many risk factors.
Thus, like in Patton (2009) we restrict our study of changing market exposure to the
US stock market as a risk factor for hedge funds.
Patton (2009) nds some evidence that market neutrality is time-varying. Also, Sadka
(2009) suggests that the outperformance of hedge funds can be partly explained by
their high exposure to innovations in market liquidity. Thus, while hedge fund trading
strategies generally lead to a low systematic risk relative to a broad US stock index,
a time-varying component might remain, possibly caused by the impact of market
illiquidity on prot opportunities and feasibility of trade strategies. In times of liquidity
crises, hedge funds are particularly hurt by the low liquidity, be it driven by limits to
arbitrage or the drying-up of funding, see Ben-David et al. (2010) and Aragon and
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Strahan (2010).
The interaction between market liquidity and systematic risk is related to the issue
of systemic risk. On the one hand, there is a clear positive role for hedge funds as
providers of liquidity, or even `lenders of last resort' (Brophy et al. (2009)). On the
other hand, hedge funds receive some blame for nancial turmoil like the Asian crisis
of 1997 or the dot-com bubble of 2000. Although in both cases no dominant role for
hedge funds can be proven, see Brown et al. (2000) and Brunnermeier and Nagel
(2004), they have played a prominent role in the run-up to the credit crisis. Khandani
and Lo (2007) explain the August 2007 market turmoil as the result of widely used
quant strategies by hedge funds, with a sudden exogenous shock leading to a margin
spiral such as described by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
As Patton (2009) suggests, we have only few choices in choosing a `market' variable
for market exposure. The median lifespan of a hedge fund is quite short so our market
model needs to be parsimonious. We follow Patton in taking the return on the S&P
500 as the market return. We test the sensitivity of our results with the S&P 400
(MidCap) and S&P 600 (SmallCap).
Our paper is related to the work of Patton (2009), who operationalizes several neu-
trality measures for hedge funds, relative to the S&P 500. We complement this line of
research by examining the impact of market liquidity on the ability of hedge funds to
maintain a market neutral prole. Further, there has been a lot of interest in recent lit-
erature on modeling time variations in hedge fund risk exposures. Bollen and Whaley
(2009) apply an optimal change-point regression that allows for discrete shifts in pa-
rameter values. They nd that this parsimonious specication outperforms a stochastic
beta model that is in general unable to capture discrete shifts in factor loadings. Pat-
ton and Ramadorai (2010) employ a similar methodology, enhanced by introducing
high frequency variations in the conditioning variables. Both studies concentrate on
explaining the dynamics of optimal exposures over a vast array of candidate factors.
In this paper we focus exclusively on hedge fund market exposure and its interactions
with market-wide liquidity. Cao et al. (2009) provide evidence of the liquidity timing
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ability of hedge fund managers who change their market exposure in line with market
liquidity conditions, reducing it during periods of liquidity dry-ups. Ben-David et al.
(2010) provide evidence of the latter fact, pointing towards a reduction in equity hold-
ings of hedge funds during liquidity crises. In addition to the market timing hypothesis,
however, we supply some evidence on the ability of hedge funds as arbitrageurs to pro-
vide liquidity during times of low market liquidity by expanding their market exposure
or to absorb liquidity by unwinding their positions, in line with the limits to arbitrage
hypothesis.
The main ndings of our empirical investigation are as follows. We nd a positive
relationship between market illiquidity and the market exposure of hedge funds prior
to 2003. For the period 2003 - 2009 we nd the opposite pattern. This result is robust
to volatility timing and the possibility of illiquid holdings. Furthermore, a changepoint
regression points to the period 2000 - 2003 as where the most funds have a signicant
shift in exposure. These ndings are in correspondence with Jylha et al. (2010), who
nd a distinct dierence in the loading on the return to a liquidity timing strategy,
before and after 2003. We conjecture that the source of hedge fund returns, and their
impact on market liquidity, has undergone a structural change in the beginning of the
21st century. Implementing a pairs trading strategy like that of Gatev et al. (2006)
shows that funds that load signicantly on the pairs trading strategy show the eect
all the stronger, while the eect partly disappears for funds that do not load on pairs
trading.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 performs time-
series regressions of market exposure and liquidity. Section 4 explores the results when
we select funds based on their exposure to a dynamic trading stratey. Section 5 checks
the robustness for 2003 as a break point in hedge fund systematic market exposures.
Section 6 concludes.
5
2 Data
For the hedge fund returns we use monthly returns and asset values of individual hedge
funds from the Lipper TASS database as provided by Thomson Reuters. We use both
live and graveyard funds. We follow the convention of starting in the year 1994, to
avoid the most serious measurement biases, see Fung and Hsieh (2002). Our sample
period is January 1994 until April 2009.
We apply the following lter to the individual funds. We discard funds that do not
report in US-dollars, have assets below $10 million or have less than 24 consecutive
months of data. We discard the rst 12 months to account for backll-bias. Unless
stated otherwise, we select hedge funds from the style classications `Equity Market
Neutral' and `Long/Short Equity Hedge', so that our selection includes the US-equity
market as primary focus.
For stock market index-returns we use the monthly total return on the S&P 500, S&P
400, and S&P 600, as provided by Datastream. For the construction of ILLIQ we
use individual stock returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
To construct the monthly ILLIQ measure for each stock, we use daily data (returns,
volume and market capitalization) for the constituents of each of the S&P indices (small
cap S&P 600, mid cap S&P 400 and large cap S&P 500) for the 1994 - 2009 period. To
obtain a market-wide illiquidity measure, we take the median of the individual ILLIQ
measures across all stocks for each month.
The risk factors used in the change-point regressions are the seven factors from Fung
and Hsieh (2004), as provided on the website of David Hsieh.
A summary of the data is in Table 1. The aggregate ILLIQ measure is in Figure 1.
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ]
[ INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE ]
Looking at Figure 1 we can observe a change in the pattern of ILLIQ, which conforms
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with the idea of mid-2003 being a watershed for market participants that are sensitive
to the market-impact of their trades, such as hedge funds. We hypothesize that the
transition of NYSE is an important driver of this observation, see Hendershott et al.
(2011).
3 Time-series regressions of market exposure and
liquidity
We start with the most straightforward test of market exposure by estimating a time-
series model for a hedge fund portfolio return with time-varying exposure, as in
Rt = i + trm;t +
X
k
kFt;k + "t; (1)
where Rt is the hedge fund portfolio return in month t, rm;t the return on the market
and Ft;k are the returns on the 7-factor model of Fung and Hsieh (2004) augmented by
innovations in illiquidity to account for priced liquidity risk. The time-variation in t
is captured by
t = 0 + 1  ILLIQt + 2  V IXt; (2)
where ILLIQt is Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure and V IXt the CBOE VIX index.
Including the latter makes sense when we want to account for the fact that market
exposure might be related to investor risk aversion, which is captured by the VIX.
We use the Amihud (2002) ILLIQ to measure stock market illiquidity. ILLIQ measures
the average daily ratio of absolute stock return to dollar volume, representing the
average price impact of a given dollar volume of a transaction. Among daily proxies,
the Amihud liquidity measure is the most strongly correlated measure with intra-day
measures of the price impact of trading, see Goyenko et al. (2009), De Jong and
Driessen (2006), Hasbrouck (2009) and Korajczyk and Sadka (2008).
We measure overall stock market illiquidity as the per-stock ILLIQ-measure, weighted
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by market capitalization, as in
ILLIQt =
1
Nt
NtX
i=1
ILLIQi;t Mt 1=M0; (3)
where N is the number of stocks in month t, Mt is the market capitalization at the end
of month t and M0 is the market cap at the beginning of the sample period. ILLIQi;t
is the ILLIQ measure for stock i in month t and is estimated as
ILLIQi;t =
1
Dt
DtX
d=1
jrdi;tj
V di;t;
(4)
where Dt denotes the number of trading days in month t, r
d
i;t denotes the return on
stock i in the dth day of month t, and V di;t denotes the dollar trading volume for stock
i in the dth day of month t. ILLIQ can be interpreted as the daily price response
associated with one dollar of trading volume, and serves as a rough measure of price
impact, see Amihud (2002).1
For comparison, we also consider the liquidity measure of Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003), which is popular in the asset pricing literature. This measure, which we ab-
breviate as PS, measures the impact of today's signed volume on tomorrow's excess
return. It is dened as the OLS-estimate of i;t in
rei;d+1;t = i;t + i;tri;d;t + i;tsign(r
e
i;d;t)  vi;d;t + "i;d+1;t; (6)
where for stock i on day d in month t, ri;d;t is the stock return, r
e
i;d;t the excess return
and vi;d;t the dollar volume. The estimated ^i;t measures the short-term (one-day)
reversal as a fraction of signed volume, and is negative, see Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003). The higher (less negative)  is, the more liquid a stock is. We use the PS
measure as provided by CRSP.
1The above dened measure of market liquidity might suer from outliers: small stocks that have
extremely low volumes in one or more days. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) propose the normalized
version of ILLIQ:
ILLIQAPi;t = min(0:25 + 0:30  ILLIQi;t; 30:00); (5)
i.e., a scaled version of ILLIQ with a maximum of 30. The results remain qualitatively unchanged
and are not reported in the current version in the paper for brevity.
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Table 2 gives the estimation results for a time-series regression with a market return
and an interaction term of the market with illiquidity, and the 7-factor returns of Fung
and Hsieh (2004). The table runs until December 2008, which is the latest month for
which CRSP has the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity measure, which we want to include
for comparison.
[ INSERT Table 2 HERE ]
Panel A of Table 2 shows that for the whole sample period, the interaction term of
market times illiquidity is positive and signicant. Thus a positive shock in aggregate
market illiquidity leads to an increase in the market exposure of hedge fund portfolios.
This nding is robust to adding the VIX index as a factor driving the time variations
of market betas, as well as to the inclusion of innovations in liquidity, which are known
to be priced in the cross-section of hedge fund returns. Further, the presence of illiq-
uid holdings in hedge fund portfolios could potentially bias the market beta estimates,
thus we also correct for this by including two lags of the market return in the regres-
sion, following Cao et al. (2009). Our ndings remain robust to that correction as
well. Interestingly, when using the Pastor-Stambaugh measure of liquidity we nd no
signicant results for the interaction term.
Panel B shows the results for the rst subperiod, split at June 2003, i.e., right after
the introduction of Autoquote at the New York Stock Exchange. With respect to
ILLIQ as market illiquidity measure, a signicant switch in the relationship between
market exposure and market-wide illiquidity is visible. Before 2003, hedge fund market
exposure is positively related to illiquidity, suggesting that hedge funds are net suppliers
of liquidity. In times with high illiquidity the market exposure is higher, and vice versa.
Thus, hedge funds are in the market when liquidity is low. This suggests a positive role
for hedge funds in the period before 2003, in accordance with the role of hedge funds
in the Asian currency crisis of 1997, see Brown et al. (1998). Brown et al. remark on
the role of hedge funds that \If anything, it appears that the top ten hedge funds were
buying into the Ringgit as it fell in the late summer and early fall of 1997".
Panel C of Table 2 shows that, after 2003, the relationship between market betas and
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illiquidity is signicantly negative. This is evidence of a liquidity timing interpretation
of hedge funds' behavior, as in Cao et al. (2009) and Ben-David et al. (2010). An
equivalent typology is that of demanding liquidity: hedge funds are more active in the
market in times of high liquidity.
Hedge fund returns are known to exhibit signicant serial correlation due to illiquid
holdings in hedge fund strategies or smoothing of reported returns on the part of
hedge fund managers (e.g. Getmansky et al. (2004)). We partially correct for the
market beta bias induced by return smoothing by including lagged market returns in
the regression model. Further, we also proceed by unsmoothing hedge fund returns
following the methodology introduced in Amvella et al. (2010). It has the advantage
of not imposing the same order of serial correlation for all return series, as it applies
the appropriate unsmoothing prole for each fund. As well, it relies on a method of
moments approach and thus does not impose assumptions on the distribution of hedge
fund returns. Results for unsmoothed returns are reported in Table 3. Our previous
nding still holds: hedge fund managers display a signicant liquidity timing ability
in the most recent period after 2003, while their market exposure remains signicantly
positively related to illiquidity prior to that.
[ INSERT Table 3 HERE ]
An additional test is provided by performing individual fund regressions. We rst
split all hedge funds in our sample in three subsamples, based on their exposure to a
large-, small- and mid-cap market index, as proxied by S&P 500, S&P 600 and S&P
400. Selection of the index associated with each fund is based on Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC). We impose the additional requirement that each fund has at least 24
consecutive observations of return history, after eliminating the rst 12 observations
to mitigate backlling bias. We then estimate our time-series model for each fund in
the sample, using the corresponding market factor for each fund. The ILLIQ factor is
also computed using the constituents of either S&P 500, S&P 600 or S&P 400. Results
are presented in Table 4 where we show the average coecient and t-statistic for the
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interaction term of market times ILLIQ for the individual fund regressions on the risk
factors. We also report the cross-sectional t-statistic to measure whether the average
loading over the funds in the sample is signicantly dierent from zero, as in Chordia
et al. (2000), Sadka (2009).
[ INSERT Table 4 HERE ]
Panel A of Table 4 shows a negative coecient on the interaction for the full sample pe-
riod. Also, the cross-sectional t-statistic has a large negative value, suggesting that the
average coecient is negative. However, there is a large heterogeneity between funds:
depending on the selection of funds, between 7 and 11% of funds have a signicant
positive coecient on the interaction term and between 15 and 25% have a negative
loading. Moreover, panel B and C of Table 4 show that the balance of the fraction of
funds loading positive and negative ips over the two subperiods. Panel B shows that
the mean coecient is on average positive for the period 1996-2003, while the fraction
of funds with a signicant positive coecient on the interaction term is larger than for
those with a negative coecient. The opposite holds for panel C, where the sample
shows more negative than positive coecients. Thus, the individual fund regressions
conrm the time-series regressions for the portfolios, and suggest a signicant switch
in exposure on the interaction term around the year 2003.
4 Time-varying market exposures through dynamic
trading strategies
The reversal found in the systematic exposure to the stock market around 2003 could
be caused by a number of factors. But foremost, it is a feature of the returns data
of hedge funds. Since we know that hedge funds employ dynamic strategies, we test
whether hedge funds that load signicantly on returns to dynamic strategies are also
more likely to show the reversal in market exposure.
Specically, we are constructing the returns to a momentum strategy and a pairs
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trading strategy. We know that timing strategies that exploit momentum and reversal
eects generate time-varying exposures to risk factors, see Blitz et al. (2011), so the
use of these strategies by hedge funds might indicate which funds have a time-varying
market exposure that is related to market liquidity.
The momentum strategy exploits the momentum in stock returns, i.e., the persistence
in performance of past winners and losing stocks, see Jegadeesh and Titman (1993),
Korajczyk and Sadka (2004). Returns to strategies that exploit momentum seem to
deliver an excess return when correcting for systematic risk, found for several other
stock markets and are present for most time periods. Here, we take the Fama-French
momentum factor as provided by Kenneth French on his website.
The other strategy we consider, pairs trading, is a Wall Street quantitative investment
strategy to perform statistical arbitrage between stocks with similar price histories. The
strategy is shown to deliver persistent outperformance, correcting for the standard risk
factors, see Gatev et al. (2006) and Engelberg et al. (2009). Pairs trading is also
a speculative strategy in the sense that it relies on the implied convergence between
prices that share statistical properties, with no particular fundamental reason why they
should converge. Hence it is just one of many arbitrage strategies that can be employed
by hedge funds. However, since it is well-known and straightforward to implement, we
take the setup of Gatev et al. to mimic the typical return on a hedge fund trading
strategy. We then form portfolios of hedge funds based on their exposure to the pairs
trading return and estimate their conditional market exposure.
We generate pairs trading-returns along the line of Gatev et al. (2006) and give a
short summary here. The full description is in the appendix. At the beginning of each
month, we rank pairs of stocks from the NYSE-Amex-NASDAQ universe based on the
sum of squared deviations of the normalized price indices over the past 12 months
(the formation period). Only stocks with a full price history over the formation period
are considered. This list of pairs is monitored during a period of six months (trading
period) to detect a widening between prices of more than two standard deviations.
The day after such an event, the pair is `opened' by going one dollar short in the
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higher-priced stock and one dollar long in the lower-priced stock. A pair is closed once
the prices cross or at the end of a 6-month trading period. The return on a pair is
computed as the reinvested payos during the trading interval. A pair can open and
close several times during the trading period. Given that we take a six month trading
period, it is assumed that six strategies (managers) are operating simultaneously, in
overlapping (six month) periods. We follow Engelberg et al. (2009) in that we also
consider a strategy that closes out pairs that do not converge after 10 days2.
We deviate from Gatev et al. (2006) in a number of ways. First, instead of computing
portfolio returns over actual capital employed, we assume that each manager has a
given amount of capital that he can use. Any capital not used (because too few pairs
are open) is invested in S&P index futures. This is in accordance with empirical
observations that hedge funds have a net long bias in the stock market. For example,
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) show that hedge funds were invested in technology
stocks in the same proportion as the market portfolio. Second, we put in two modeling
assumptions on the extent to which pairs trading is employed by the hedge fund sector:
at the beginning of a six-month trading period, the manager can employ capital equal
to ve percent of total market volume. On top of that, he can only invest a maximum
of 40% of a pair's total dollar volume in a pair. These assumptions reect the fact
that (i) capital involved in pairs trading depends on total market volume, and (ii) the
number of pairs that can be traded depends on the trading volume of the individual
stocks. Bid-ask spreads, trading costs and the price-impact of trading are likely to
increase with the decrease of trading volume. In all, these assumptions transform the
pairs trading portfolio return into a strategy return that shares some of the features of
an industry-wide return to pairs trading. Third, to capture the eect of illiquid stocks
in the pairs-trading portfolios, we also consider a strategy where infrequently traded
stocks, i.e., those without a full price history, are allowed to be selected for the pairs.
Also, we capture the potential impact of transaction costs by selecting only pairs from
the top-third most expensive stocks to trade, based on Proportional Eective Spread
2The results when using the 10-day closing period are practically similar to those implied by the
strategy of unrestricted trading within the investment period, and are not reported for brevity.
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(PESPR). PESPR is dened as the bid-ask spread over the price, see Chordia et al.
(2000), Engelberg et al. (2009).
To summarize, we have four dierent pairs-trading strategies. The rst one is the
original selection of Gatev et al., with a constant number of 20 traded pairs. The
second one is modied to have a long-bias in the S&P 500, but with the same number
of 20 traded pairs. The third one has a exible number of pairs, depending on the
market volume, as explained above, but a with a maximum of 200 eligible pairs to
choose from. The fourth one is the strategy that is geared towards stocks that are
less frequently traded and have higher spreads, by selecting from the top-200 pairs
with highest PESPR and including stocks with an incomplete price history. Table 5
shows the descriptive statistics of the momentum strategy and the four pairs-trading
strategies.
[ INSERT Table 5 HERE ]
In order to analyze these dynamic trading strategies as a potential source of time
variations in the market exposure of hedge fund returns, induced by changes in market
illiquidity, we look at whether hedge fund returns load signicantly on them. Results
are presented in Table 6, which reports the number and average size of signicant
loadings of hedge funds on the dynamic strategy return.
[ INSERT Table 6 HERE ]
The momentum strategy, as well as the original pairs trading strategy proposed by
Gatev et al. (2006), appear to be signicant only for less than 15% of all funds in our
sample. However, around 60% of the funds load signicantly on the three modied
pairs trading strategies, while about 24% load positively, but insignicantly. Only 4%
have a negative and signicant loading on pairs trading. Thus, our pairs trading return
seems to capture a systematic element in the variation of hedge fund returns. This
is not surprising, given that the motivation and implementation of the pairs trading
strategy is mimicking industry practice, albeit in a stylized and non-sophisticated way,
see Gatev et al. (2006). We therefore use the two pairs-trading strategies that allow
for a exible number of traded pairs in our subsequent analysis. The modied strategy
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that uses a xed number of pairs for trading yields similar results that we do not report
for brevity.
To see whether the liquidity eect found above is related to pairs trading, we now use
the pairs trading return to sort hedge funds into portfolios. The rst portfolio consists
of hedge funds that load positively and signicantly on the pairs trading return. The
second portfolio consists of hedge funds that have an insignicant, but positive loading
on the pairs trading return. The third portfolio consists of hedge funds that have
no signicant loading on pairs trading. We then regress each portfolio on the market
return and the interaction term of market times illiquidity, controlling for the other
risk factors, as in Table 2. Table 7 has the results for the pairs-trading strategy \PT-
exible", Table 8 for the strategy \PT-illiquid". Only the coecients for the market
return and the interaction term are shown.
[ INSERT Table 7 HERE ]
[ INSERT Table 8 HERE ]
The \All funds" columns of Table 7 show the familiar result of a switch in the loading
on the interaction term: positive before 2003 and negative after. The same result
is found in the columns \PT-exposed funds", with a slightly smaller (less positive)
loading before 2003, but more negative after the break. For the non PT-exposed funds,
however, we see a striking deviation from earlier results: there is no positive loading
on the interaction term before the break, and a non-signicant negative loading after
the break. For the funds with negative PT-exposure, only the negative loadings after
the break are signicant. Thus, sorting on pairs-trading exposure selects funds that
do, and do not exhibit a switching behavior with respect to the interaction term of
market and illiquidity.
The results in Table 8 are based on exposure to a pairs-trading strategy that is explicitly
skewed towards less liquid stocks to capture a possible liquidity eect caused by the
selection of stocks. The result are qualitatively the same as in Table 8: the portfolio
with PT-exposed funds are very similar to the All-funds portfolio, but the portfolio with
non PT-exposed funds does not show the signicant switch over the 2003 breakpoint.
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The same holds for the portfolio with funds that have a negative PT-exposure.
With respect to both Table 7 and 8, we see a clear evidence of liquidity timing ability
for the post-2003 period. I.e., the loading on the interaction term of the market return
times ILLIQ is negative, so that market exposure of hedge funds is lower in times of
higher market illiquidity. This suggest that the ndings of Cao et al. (2009), who nd
evidence for this form of liquidity timing, are only valid for the most recent period.
5 How unique is 2003?
Motivated by the introduction of Autoquote on NYSE in 2003 and the dramatic im-
provement in liquidity that followed we have split our sample in June 2003. However,
we want to test the sensitivity of our results to the exact date of the breakpoint.
In order to test for fund-specic breakpoints, we perform a changepoint regression on
individual funds, as in Bollen and Whaley (2009) and Patton and Ramadorai (2010).
It starts from a a general model for individual hedge fund returns with time-varying
exposures, as in
Rit = i + itrm;t +
X
k
i;kFt;k + "it; (7)
where Rit is the return of hedge fund i in month t, rm;t the return on the market and
Ft;k are the returns on the 7-factor model of Fung and Hsieh (2004). The time-variation
in it is specied as
it = bi0 + b

i0  1ft>ig + bi1  ILLIQm;t + bi1  ILLIQm;t  1ft>ig; (8)
where 1fAg is the indicator function for event A and i is the change-point for fund i.
We can combine equations (7) and (8) into one regression as
Rit = i +
 
bi0 + b

i0  1ft>ig
  rm;t
+
 
bi1 + b

i1  1ft>ig
  ILLIQm;t  rm;t
+
X
k
i;kFt;k + "it:
(9)
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For every fund, the model in Equation (9) is estimated for every change-point i.
The optimal change-point  i is the one that minimizes the sum of squared errors
over all candidate change-points. Since the model is estimated for every change-point,
we cannot use standard coecient tests. Therefore, we test for signicance by using a
bootstrap procedure, see Patton and Ramadorai (2010) and Bollen and Whaley (2009).
It is a two-stage procedure that consists rst in estimating a constant parameter model
under the null of no signicant change-point, i.e., a constant parameter model with
bi0 = b

i1 = 0. We then draw bootstrap samples of hedge fund returns by re-sampling
the residuals and adding them to the tted return estimates. In order to account for
autocorrelation of returns, we follow Patton and Ramadorai (2010) and Politis and
Romano (1994) in that we draw the residuals in blocks of random size and starting
point. The block lengths are drawn from a geometric distribution. In the second stage,
we estimate an optimal change-point regression on each bootstrap sample. For each
candidate changepoint we compute the F-statistic of Andrews et al. (1996):
F (i) =
[SSE   SSE (i)] (T   2)
SSE (i) 
(10)
where SSE is the sum of squared errors of the estimated constant parameter model,
SSE (i) corresponds to the change-point regression for time i, and  equals the
number of factors in the change-point regression plus one. The signicance of a change-
point i is determined by the test statistic F :
F =
X
i
F (i)w (i) ; (11)
computed for equal weights w (i). We consider a change-point parameter shift to be
signicant for a fund i if its Fi statistic exceeds the 90
th percentile of the distribution
of the F statistic.
The funds for which we nd a signicant changepoint are graphically depicted in Fig-
ure 2. The Figure shows the largest peak of signicant change-points around the year
2000. Moreover, the peaks of the change-points correspond to market-wide events as
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the LTCM-crisis of September 1998, the stock market crash in 2000 and the credit crisis
of 2007/2008. This conrms the intuition that market-wide events have an impact on
the systematic exposure of hedge funds. Bollen and Whaley (2009) also suggest that
the peak in changepoints around 2000 is related to the end of the internet bubble. The
one peak in Figure 2 that is not associated with a crisis or stock market decline is the
year 2003, which we in this paper associate with the introduction of automated trading
on the NYSE.
[ INSERT Figure 2 HERE ]
To test for the sensitivity of our results to the exact date of June 2003 for splitting
the sample, however, we need to use a dierent method than changepoint regressions.
The changepoint regressions assume that the loadings on the other risk factors are
stable. If they are not, the coecient estimates are likely to be biased. So, to verify
whether the break is in the direction of our ndings for the two subperiods, we perform
a test whereby we vary the month of the breakpoint and measure the coecient on the
interaction term of the market return times illiquidity. Since it allows all loadings to
change over the breakpoint, it better captures the change in loading on the interaction
term. Figure 3 has the results, for the three dierent stock indices: Large, Mid and
SmallCap. The underlying regression is that of Table 2, with a portfolio of hedge funds
as the dependent variable and the lagged market return is included as a control.
[ INSERT Figure 3 here ]
The values of the T-statistics in Figure 3 reach the critical 95% signicance level at
dierent dates, depending on the type of index and whether we consider the positive
coecient before and negative coecient after the breakpoint. Panel A shows that
the positive coecient before the breakpoint turns signicant around mid-2003 for all
markets. The signicance for break points after 2003 corresponds to the results in
Table 2, where the coecient estimate is positive and signicant for the whole sample
as well as the rst subperiod.
Panel B of Figure 3 shows how the negative coecient after the breakpoint is signicant
for breakpoints after 2001 for the S&P 500 and S&P 400. For the S&P 600 SmallCap
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the coecient turns signicant after end-1999. For the most early breakpoints the
coecient is positive and signicant, corresponding to the positive coecient for the
whole sample in Table 2.
The fact that signicance in Panel A is found only after 2003, and in Panel B before
2001 could indicate that the positive and signicant coecients of Panel A and Table 2
are measuring a weaker eect, for which a longer data series is necessary. On the other
hand, we should take into account that over the breakpoint date, all exposures are
allowed to change, including the loading on the market index itself.
[ INSERT Figure 4 here ]
The dierence between the Small Cap and the other markets disappear if we restrict
the sample to funds that load signicantly on the PT-illiquid strategy. Figure 4 shows
the evolution of t-statistics over breakpoint dates when we restrict funds to only those
that load on PT-illiquid, as in Table 8. In the gure, the lines for the respective markets
are much closer together than in Figure 3. This is a result of the narrower selection of
fund, ltering out funds that, according to Table 8, display no switching behavior in
the interaction term of the market and illiquidity. In all, both Figures 3 and Figure 4
conrm a signicant structural shift in parameters for the dynamic loading of hedge
funds on the stock market around 2003, caused by market liquidity.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we document a shift in systematic stock market exposure of hedge funds,
possibly caused by the dramatic improvement of liquidity in 2003. We nd a distinctly
dierent pattern of market risk and illiquidity before and after 2003, with illiquidity
measured by Amihud's (2002) measure of stock market illiquidity. Before the break-
point, hedge fund betas are positively related to ILLIQ, while afterwards they are neg-
atively related. When Hendershott and Riordan (2009) observe that the introduction
of Autoquote (automated trading) on NYSE in 2003 has changed the market structure
by opening it up for algorithmic trading, our results are suggestive of an eect on the
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relation between market exposures of hedge funds and market liquidity.
One interpretation of our ndings is that, before 2003, hedge funds acted as suppliers
of liquidity, having a higher market exposure when stocks are undervalued due to low
liquidity. This explains the positive coecient on an interaction term of the market
return times illiquidity. The reversal after 2003 points to a fundamental shift in how
hedge funds interact with the stock market. The higher level of overall liquidity and
the surge in automated trading have led to a liquidity timing behavior that was not
possible, or too expensive, before that time. This is supported by the fact that funds
with no exposure to pairs-trading return show no switch at all. This suggests an
explanation rooted in sophisticated dynamic strategies used by hedge funds, of which
the pairs trading strategies mimicked in this paper can only bear a rough resemblance.
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Appendix A: The pairs trading algorithm
The algorithm for constructing a pairs trading strategy follows the setup of Gatev et al.
(2006). At the beginning of each calendar month we start by identifying the pairs eligible for
trading over the following 6-month trading period. The pairs formation period is 12 months
prior to the trading period. We lter out stocks that do not trade continuously over the whole
12 month period to ensure relatively liquid stocks being traded. (This selection is relaxed
for a specic variant of the pairs-trading return, PT-illiquid for which we want to capture
exposure to less liquid stocks.) For each stock i a normalized price series Pit, with Pi0  1
is constructed, where t=0 is the start of the formation period. For a given month m, the
selection criterion for a `pair' is the sum of squared dierences between the two normalized
price series:
Di;j;m =
mX
t=1
(Pi;t   Pj;t)2 ; (A1)
where m is the number of trading days in the 12-month formation period prior to month m.
Each month, the top N pairs are selected that have the smallest distance measure during the
pairs formation period.3 They form the pool of eligible pairs for trading in the following 6
months.
During the trading period, the price-dierence of the eligible pairs are observed on a daily
basis. Once a pair has diverged by more than two standard deviations, the lower-priced stock
is bought and the higher-priced stock is sold (short). The transaction is assumed to take
place one day after divergence to mitigate any market microstructure eects. The positions
are closed once the prices of the pair have converged or at the end of the 6-month trading
period, whichever comes rst. We also apply an alternative rule of unwinding a position after
convergence or up to a maximum of 10 days, following Engelberg et al. (2009). Note that a
position in a pair can be opened an closed several times during the trading period. As well,
some eligible pairs never trade due to lack of divergence over the 6-month period.
For each pair P traded on day t the buy-and-hold return rP;t is dened as
rP;t =
P
i2P
wi;tri;tP
i2P
wi;t
; (A2)
where ri denotes the return on security i of pair P and the weights wi are given by
wi;t = (1 + ri;1) : : : (1 + ri;t 1) : (A3)
3We choose N = 20 for the pairs-trading strategy that replicates the methodology of Gatev et al.
(2006).
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The return on the portfolio of pairs is calculated as the return on invested capital, giving equal
weights on all pairs selected for trading. Daily returns are compounded in order to obtain
monthly returns. At the start of each month m a new pairs-trading strategy is started, so
that we obtain a series of six overlapping portfolio returns on strategies, each starting one
month apart. The pairs-trading strategy return is the monthly average of the six running
portfolio returns.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of fund and market index returns
This table presents descriptive statistics on monthly fund and market index returns over the sample period January 1994 to April 2009. The columns
headed \median fund" present the medians of the statistics in the rows across the funds in each style category with at least twelve observations. The
penultimate row gives the median number of time series observations.
Median fund
Equity Market Long/Short Event Convertible S&P 500 S&P 400 S&P 600
Neutral Equity Driven Arbitrage
Mean 0.34 0.61 0.63 0.51 0.63 0.85 0.84
Median 0.34 0.61 0.63 0.51 0.63 0.70 0.67
Standard deviation 2.03 3.49 2.14 1.68 4.48 5.07 5.41
Skewness -0.28 -0.19 -0.54 -0.51 -0.75 -0.77 -0.66
Kurtosis 4.24 4.29 5.80 5.30 4.13 5.31 4.56
Minimum -5.36 -9.10 -6.53 -5.05 -16.80 -21.58 -20.19
Maximum 4.70 9.11 5.70 4.64 9.78 14.95 17.53
Jarque-Bera statistic 6.66 7.58 30.64 23.62 27.46 59.63 32.47
Jarque-Bera p-value 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Autocorr. lag 1 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.40 0.12 0.18 0.13
Autocorr. lag 2 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.12 -0.03 -0.12 -0.10
Number of obs. 46 51 59 65 186 186 186
Total number of obs. 607 3432 743 255 - - -
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Table 2: Portfolio regression with Equity Market Neutral and Long/Short Equity funds
This table reports the outcomes of six separate time-series regressions. The dependent variable is the return on the value-weighted portfolio of funds
with Long/Short Equity Hedge (LSE) and Equity Market Neutral (EMN) style descriptors. Per subperiod, the regression is estimated seperately for
ILLIQ and PS as measures of liquidity. ILLIQ is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, PS is the Pastor-Stambaugh (2002) measure of liquidity,
mkt is the return on the value-weighted CRSP return, mkt*L is the interaction term of the market return with the (il)liquidity measure, VIX is the
CBOE implied volatility index, mkt t-1, mkt t-2 are the one and two-month lagged market returns, smb is the Fama-French small-minus-big factor,
yldchange is the change in the term spread, def is default spread, ptfsbd, ptfsfx and ptfscom are the bond, currency and commodity timing factors
from Fung and Hsieh (2004) as provided by David Hsieh on his website, L is the innovations in the corresponding liquidity factor. Newey-West
t-statistics between parentheses and *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1%-level, respectively.
mkt mkt  L mkt  VIX mkt t-1 mkt t-2 smb yldchg def ptfsbd ptfsfx ptfscom L R2
Panel A: whole period
Liq PS 0:48 0:00 0:00 0:04 0:11 0:27  0:63 1:31  0:35  0:17 0:41 2:30 0:76
(6:30) ( 0:01) ( 0:95) (1:55) (4:19) (5:08) ( 1:37) (1:20) ( 0:41) ( 0:41) (0:52) (1:70)
ILLIQ 0:36 0:26 0:00 0:02 0:11 0:25  0:68  0:06  0:25  0:14 0:50  2:74 0:77
(4:88) (2:31) ( 2:36) (1:04) (4:58) (4:33) ( 1:60) ( 0:06) ( 0:33) ( 0:41) (0:62) ( 1:82)
Panel B: 1994 - 2003
Liq PS 0:48 0:87 0:00 0:02 0:12 0:32  0:01 3:44  1:15 0:05 0:76  0:35 0:83
(5:11) (2:46) ( 0:34) (1:07) (4:86) (7:34) ( 0:02) (2:80) ( 1:35) (0:11) (0:89) ( 0:21)
ILLIQ 0:26 0:48  0:01 0:04 0:12 0:30  0:06 2:05  0:50 0:06 0:45  1:47 0:83
(2:73) (3:40) ( 2:32) (1:86) (4:53) (5:77) ( 0:09) (1:34) ( 0:58) (0:13) (0:55) ( 1:03)
Panel C: 2003 - 2008
Liq PS 0:66  0:85  0:01 0:05 0:09 0:02  0:87  1:32 0:48  0:12 0:93 2:23 0:74
(6:66) ( 1:48) ( 3:93) (1:29) (2:88) (0:26) ( 1:34) ( 0:61) (0:36) ( 0:16) (0:96) (1:02)
ILLIQ 0:85  1:75 0:00 0:01 0:15 0:00  0:79  1:72 0:86 0:13 0:93  22:35 0:76
(5:74) ( 2:00) ( 0:50) (0:16) (4:22) (0:06) ( 1:31) ( 1:26) (0:89) (0:21) (0:94) ( 3:19)
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Table 3: Portfolio regression with unsmoothed hedge fund returns
For hedge fund returns corrected for serial correlation, this table reports the outcomes of six separate time-series regressions. The dependent variable
is the return on the value-weighted portfolio of funds with Long/Short Equity Hedge (LSE) and Equity Market Neutral (EMN) style descriptors. Per
subperiod, the regression is estimated seperately for ILLIQ and PS as measures of liquidity. ILLIQ is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, PS is
the Pastor-Stambaugh (2002) measure of liquidity, mkt is the return on the value-weighted CRSP return, mkt*L is the interaction term of the market
return with the (il)liquidity measure, VIX is the CBOE implied volatility index, mkt t-1, mkt t-2 are the one and two-month lagged market returns,
smb is the Fama-French small-minus-big factor, yldchange is the change in the term spread, def is default spread, ptfsbd, ptfsfx and ptfscom are the
bond, currency and commodity timing factors from Fung and Hsieh (2004) as provided by David Hsieh on his website, L is the innovations in the
corresponding liquidity factor. Newey-West t-statistics between parentheses and *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1%-level, respectively.
mkt mkt  L mkt  VIX mkt t-1 mkt t-2 smb yldchg def ptfsbd ptfsfx ptfscom L R2
Panel A: whole period
Liq PS 0:57  0:04 0:00 0:00 0:10 0:30  0:75 1:09  0:48  0:20 0:63 3:28 0:76
(6:57) ( 0:08) ( 1:21) ( 0:11) (3:54) (5:10) ( 1:50) (0:89) ( 0:52) ( 0:44) (0:69) (2:10)
ILLIQ 0:47 0:22  0:01  0:02 0:10 0:27  0:70  0:16  0:41  0:16 0:71  3:76 0:77
(5:15) (1:63) ( 2:46) ( 0:69) (3:91) (4:29) ( 1:44) ( 0:14) ( 0:49) ( 0:42) (0:76) ( 2:20)
Panel B: 1994 - 2003
Liq PS 0:55 0:93 0:00  0:01 0:11 0:35  0:06 3:50  1:24 0:00 0:90 0:21 0:83
(5:31) (2:32) ( 0:45) ( 0:46) (4:33) (7:47) ( 0:09) (2:72) ( 1:33) (0:00) (0:97) (0:11)
ILLIQ 0:30 0:52  0:01 0:00 0:11 0:33  0:07 1:99  0:52 0:01 0:58  2:23 0:84
(3:08) (3:49) ( 2:48) (0:07) (4:09) (5:81) ( 0:10) (1:24) ( 0:56) (0:03) (0:65) ( 1:42)
Panel C: 2003 - 2008
Liq PS 0:81  0:99  0:01 0:02 0:07 0:01  0:90  1:24 0:26  0:16 1:34 3:37 0:73
(6:70) ( 1:33) ( 3:76) (0:41) (2:12) (0:08) ( 1:09) ( 0:48) (0:17) ( 0:18) (1:15) (1:27)
ILLIQ 1:08  2:36 0:00  0:04 0:15  0:01  0:77  1:90 0:68 0:17 1:35  26:19 0:75
(6:19) ( 2:34) ( 0:33) ( 0:60) (3:60) ( 0:10) ( 1:05) ( 1:14) (0:61) (0:24) (1:11) ( 3:20)
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Table 4: Individual fund regressions
This table shows the cross-sectional statistics for the interaction term Rm ILLIQ in the regressions
of individual hedge fund returns on the hedge fund risk factors. For each column, funds are selected
based on the exposure the index. The market return and ILLIQ measure are computed for each index
separately. The regressions include the hedge funds risk factors, as in Table 2. The cross-sectional
t-statistic is the t-statistic for the test on whether the average estimate of the individual regressions
is dierent from zero. The fraction of funds with signicant positive or negative loadings uses the 5%
signicance level.
All funds S&P 500 S&P 400 S&P 600
Panel A: 1996 - 2009
Mean coecient  0:40  0:13  0:46  0:78
Mean t-statistic  0:47  0:19  0:67  0:69
Cross-sectional t-statistic  3:92  0:82  2:34  5:67
Fraction of signicant positive coecients 0:09 0:11 0:08 0:07
Fraction of signicant negative coecients 0:20 0:15 0:25 0:24
Panel B: 1996 - 2003
Mean coecient 0:23 0:30 0:16 0:13
Mean t-statistic 0:25 0:39 0:12 0:07
Cross-sectional t-statistic 2:24 1:82 0:82 1:21
Fraction of signicant positive coecients 0:16 0:18 0:14 0:11
Fraction of signicant negative coecients 0:09 0:08 0:11 0:08
Panel C: 2003 - 2009
Mean coecient  0:71  0:52  0:85  0:80
Mean t-statistic  0:77  0:75  0:90  0:58
Cross-sectional t-statistic  3:29  1:16  3:13  2:56
Fraction of signicant positive coecients 0:06 0:06 0:06 0:07
Fraction of signicant negative coecients 0:24 0:23 0:26 0:24
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Table 5: Performance of the dynamic strategies
Descriptive statistics of monthly excess returns to the dynamic strategies for the period January
1994 to April 2009. \MOM-FF" is the return to momentum, i.e., the return on the long portfolio of
past 12-month winning stocks minus the return on the past 12-month losing stocks, as provided by
Kenneth French on his website. \PT-original" is the pairs trading strategy from Gatev et al. (2006),
exploiting temporary deviations in the stock price-paths of the top-20 of matching pairs of stock.
\PT-modied" is a modication whereby the funds not invested in pairs are assumed to be invested
in the S&P 500 index future. \PT-exible" is a modication where we take the total hedge fund
industry size as starting assets and restrict pairs trading to a maximum of 40% of the dollar volume
of each stock, with total pairs trading volume a maximum of 5% of the total market dollar volume
at the end of each month. There is no restriction on the number of traded pairs. The remaining
assets not invested in pairs trading are invested in the S&P 500. "PT-illiquid" is the strategy where
stocks with an incomplete price history are allowed and those with high eective spreads are selected.
It restricts pairs trading to a maximum of 40% of the dollar volume of each stock, with total pairs
trading volume a maximum of 1% of the total market dollar volume at the end of each month. Stocks
considered for the pairs trading are all from the NYSE-Amex universe as provided in the CRSP daily
stock le.
MOM-FF PT-original PT-modied PT-more pairs PT-illiquid
mean 0.58 0.13 0.330 0.28 0.36
median 0.79 0.14 0.493 0.43 1.05
stdev 5.98 0.42 1.796 1.61 3.85
skew -1.54 0.29 -0.873 -1.14 -0.93
kurt 11.37 4.12 6.143 7.28 5.79
min -34.75 -1.04 -6.988 -7.56 -18.46
max 18.39 1.54 6.360 5.24 10.80
Lag 1 autocorr. 0.07 0.05 0.228 0.20 0.20
Lag 2 autocorr. -0.10 -0.12 -0.044 -0.01 -0.05
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Table 6: Hedge fund loadings on the dynamic strategies
This table reports summary statistics of regression outcomes of individual hedge funds on the
dynamic strategies. See Table 5 and the text for the description of the strategies. Signicance is
based on 5%-signicance.
MOM-FF PT-original PT-modied PT-exible PT-illiquid
Average loading -0.01 1.00 1.06 1.31 1.09
Average t-stat -0.06 0.65 3.04 2.99 2.91
Signicantly positive loadings
Fraction 0.13 0.15 0.62 0.60 0.61
Beta coecient 0.33 3.52 1.66 2.10 1.69
Average t-stat 3.71 2.63 4.88 4.96 4.77
Signicantly negative loadings
Fraction 0.18 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
Beta coecient -0.32 -3.27 -0.95 -1.20 -1.01
Average t-stat -3.25 -2.82 -3.67 -3.85 -3.91
Insignicant positive loadings
Fraction 0.38 0.56 0.23 0.24 0.24
Beta coecient 0.11 1.52 0.42 0.60 0.57
Average t-stat 0.90 0.92 1.10 1.14 1.13
Insignicant negative loadings
Fraction 0.31 0.27 0.11 0.11 0.12
Beta coecient -0.12 -1.10 -0.24 -0.32 -0.24
Average t-stat -0.88 -0.71 -0.79 -0.81 -0.81
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Table 7: Regression results for portfolio sorts on modied pairs-trading exposure
This table reports the outcome of a time-series regression. Dependent variable is the return on the value-weighted portfolio of funds sorted on exposure
to the pairs trading return \PT-exible". \All funds" is the portfolio with hedge funds with styles Long/Short Equity (LSE) and Equity Market
Neutral (EMN). \PT-exposed funds" is the subset of the all-funds portfolio that includes only funds which have a signicant positive loading on the
return to the pairs trading strategy, \non PT-exposed" is the portfolio with the funds with insignicant positive exposure and 'negative PT-exposure'
is for funds with negative exposure to the pair-trading return. Rm is the market return, Rm ILLIQ is the interaction term of the market return
with Amihud's illiquidity measure. Included, but not reported are the hedge fund risk factors as in Table 2. T-statistics are between parenthe-
ses, based on heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected standard errors. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1%-level, respectively.
All funds PT-exposed funds non PT-exposed negative PT-exposure
Rm Rm  ILLIQ Rm Rm  ILLIQ Rm Rm  ILLIQ Rm Rm  ILLIQ
Panel A: 1996 - 2009
S&P 500 0:11 0:69 0:29 0:62 0:18  0:28  0:17 0:02
(1:35) (3:66) (3:03) (2:83) (3:60) ( 2:27) ( 2:19) (0:08)
S&P 400 MidCap 0:13 0:54 0:29 0:51 0:15  0:14  0:06  0:09
(2:06) (3:95) (4:14) (3:48) (3:66) ( 1:56) ( 0:71) ( 0:56)
S&P 600 SmallCap 0:07 0:46 0:19 0:47 0:11  0:07  0:04  0:12
(1:20) (5:27) (3:01) (4:79) (2:90) ( 1:03) ( 0:58) ( 1:02)
Panel B: 1996 - 2003
S&P 500 0:03 0:88 0:25 0:73 0:08  0:07  0:47 0:63
(0:20) (2:69) (1:73) (2:21) (0:84) ( 0:34) ( 2:64) (1:39)
S&P 400 MidCap 0:09 0:63 0:27 0:55 0:05 0:02  0:18 0:10
(0:77) (2:77) (2:31) (2:47) (0:62) (0:14) ( 1:32) (0:43)
S&P 600 SmallCap 0:11 0:41 0:27 0:38 0:07  0:04  0:09  0:06
(0:83) (2:22) (1:84) (1:78) (0:82) ( 0:30) ( 0:55) ( 0:28)
Panel C: 2003 - 2009
S&P 500 0:93  3:38 1:15  3:72 0:45  1:45 0:42  2:80
(5:71) ( 4:22) (6:46) ( 4:24) (2:71) ( 1:74) (2:61) ( 3:56)
S&P 400 MidCap 0:74  2:22 0:91  2:32 0:40  1:01 0:36  2:20
(5:94) ( 4:26) (6:81) ( 4:15) (3:09) ( 1:78) (2:91) ( 4:32)
S&P 600 SmallCap 0:67  1:47 0:86  1:65 0:32  0:57 0:21  1:14
(6:04) ( 4:34) (6:95) ( 4:36) (2:70) ( 1:49) (2:37) ( 4:34)
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Table 8: Results for pairs trading with high-spread stocks
This table reports the outcome of a time-series regression. Dependent variable is the return on the value-weighted portfolio of funds sorted on
exposure to the pairs trading return \PT-illiquid". This is the strategy where funds with an incomplete return history and the highest spreads
are selected for the pairs. \All funds" is the portfolio with hedge funds with styles Long/Short Equity (LSE) and Equity Market Neutral (EMN).
\PT-exposed funds" is the subset of the all-funds portfolio that includes only funds which have a signicant positive loading on the return to
the pairs trading strategy, \non PT-exposed" is the portfolio with the funds with insignicant positive exposure and 'negative PT-exposure' is
for funds with negative exposure to the pair-trading return. Rm is the market return, Rm ILLIQ is the interaction term of the market return
with Amihud's illiquidity measure. Included, but not reported are the hedge fund risk factors as in Table 2. T-statistics are between parenthe-
ses, based on heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected standard errors. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1%-level, respectively.
All funds PT-exposed funds non PT-exposed negative PT-exposure
Rm Rm  ILLIQ Rm Rm  ILLIQ Rm Rm  ILLIQ Rm Rm  ILLIQ
Panel A: 1996 - 2009
S&P 500 0:11 0:69 0:27 0:64 0:13  0:19  0:21 0:26
(1:35) (3:66) (3:05) (2:92) (2:50) ( 1:34) ( 3:34) (1:36)
S&P 400 MidCap 0:13 0:54 0:26 0:56 0:10  0:01  0:12 0:13
(2:06) (3:95) (3:59) (3:18) (1:99) ( 0:06) ( 1:72) (0:80)
S&P 600 SmallCap 0:07 0:46 0:18 0:47 0:07  0:02  0:10 0:04
(1:20) (5:27) (2:83) (4:49) (1:75) ( 0:32) ( 1:46) (0:39)
Panel B: 1996 - 2003
S&P 500 0:03 0:88 0:26 0:71 0:11  0:14  0:39 0:61
(0:20) (2:69) (1:76) (2:09) (0:87) ( 0:50) ( 2:98) (1:83)
S&P 400 MidCap 0:09 0:63 0:24 0:63 0:06 0:04  0:20 0:26
(0:77) (2:77) (1:97) (2:50) (0:55) (0:19) ( 1:87) (1:17)
S&P 600 SmallCap 0:11 0:41 0:27 0:37 0:13  0:14  0:14 0:10
(0:83) (2:22) (1:90) (1:74) (1:15) ( 0:83) ( 1:22) (0:56)
Panel C: 2003 - 2009
S&P 500 0:93  3:38 1:08  3:36 0:45  1:68 0:24  1:95
(5:71) ( 4:22) (6:22) ( 3:97) (2:79) ( 2:04) (2:54) ( 4:26)
S&P 400 MidCap 0:74  2:22 0:86  2:04 0:39  1:14 0:21  1:58
(5:94) ( 4:26) (6:64) ( 3:69) (3:19) ( 2:09) (2:94) ( 5:42)
S&P 600 SmallCap 0:67  1:47 0:81  1:49 0:30  0:61 0:11  0:82
(6:04) ( 4:34) (6:69) ( 3:99) (2:52) ( 1:60) (1:82) ( 4:32)
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Figure 2: Signicant changepoints
This graph shows the estimated change points (under 90% signicance) with respect to the
interaction term in the regression of the hedge fund return on the S&P 500. The funds are
of the type Long/Short Equity (LSE) or Equity Market Neutral (EMN). The y-axis is the
percentage of hedge funds with a signicant changepoint over all candidate funds.
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Figure 3: T-statistics before and after breakpoints
This graph shows the t-values for the interaction term of ILLIQ times the market for a given
date that splits up the sample. Panel A has the t-values for the sample before the end date
on the x-axis. Panel B has the t-values for the sample after the start date on the x-axis. The
solid line represents the results for the portfolio of Long/Short Equity (LSE) and Equity
Market Neutral (EMN) hedge funds that are associated with the S&P 500 as the market
index, using the AIC selection criterion. In the same way, the dashed line is for the S&P 400
MidCap and the dotted line for the S&P 600 SmallCap index. The regression specication
is identical to the one specied in Table 2, i.e. controlling for the usual risk factors, illiquid
holdings with lagged S&P returns and volatility timing with the VIX index.
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Figure 4: T-statistics before and after breakpoints for PT-illiquid exposed funds
This graph shows the t-values for the interaction term of ILLIQ times the market for a given
date that splits up the sample. Panel A has the t-values for the sample before the end date
on the x-axis. Panel B has the t-values for the sample after the start date on the x-axis. The
solid line represents the results for the portfolio of Long/Short Equity (LSE) and Equity
Market Neutral (EMN) hedge funds that have a signicant exposure to the pairs trading
return \PT-illiquid", i.e. the strategy where funds with an incomplete return history and
the highest spreads are selected for the pairs. The solid line corresponds to the S&P 500 as
the market index, the dashed line - to the S&P 400 MidCap and the dotted line - to the
S&P 600 SmallCap index. The regression specication is identical to the one specied in
Table 2, i.e. controlling for the usual risk factors, illiquid holdings with lagged S&P returns
and volatility timing with the VIX index.
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